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Chapter Seven

Aristotle, Kant, and the Ethics of the
Young Marx
Philip J. Kain

I would like to argue that the young Marx's ethical views have been
influenced not only by Hegel but even more so by Aristotle and Kant.
Marx draws away from Hegel's concept of essence toward one more like
Aristotle's , and he operates with a concept of universalization similar to
that found in Kant' s categorical imperative. At the same time, Marx's
task is to reconcile these Aristotelian and Kantian elements.
Marx's main concern, however, is not simply to explain what morality
is but to explain how it can be realized in the world. For us to understand
his views we first must gain at least a basic understanding of what morality
means for the young Marx. To do this we must examine several concepts
and the way in which they are connected to each other: his concepts of
freedom , essence, and the state. Then we will be able to understand his
concept of universalization and will begin to see how it is like Kant's
concept of a categorical imperative. Once we have taken these preparatory steps, we can begin to talk about what really interests Marx, namely,
how morality can be realized in society. Let us begin by discussing
Marx's concepts of the state and freedom.

I
In his very earliest writings, by which I mean those written before the
Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law of 1843, Marx accepts a Hegelian
form of state. For Marx, the state should be an organic unity that molds
its members and institutions into a spiritual whole. It transforms individual aims and particular interests into general aims and universal moral
concerns. It transforms "natural independence into spiritual freedom , by
the individual finding his good in the life of the whole, and the whole in
the frame of mind of the individual. " 1
213
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Morality, for the young Marx-as for Hegel, Aristotle, and othersonly arises in a state, and moral theory is inseparable from social and
political theory. 2 Morality involves obeying universal rational laws, but it
is not enough that these laws be subjectively rational, that is, based on
the rationality of the individual. These laws and their rationality must be
objective. They must be the public laws of the state, and reason must be
objectified in the state's institutions. Only in this way can freedom be
objective. It is only the state that is " the great organism, in which legal,
moral, and political freedom must be realized, and in which the individual
citizen in obeying the laws of the state only obeys the natural laws of his
own reason, of human reason." The state must be the realization of
reason; then morality will be the " principle of a world that obeys its own
laws. " 3
We can begin to understand this by looking at Hegel. He distinguished
between Moralitiit, which is usually translated as "morality," and SittLichkeit, which is usually translated as "ethics" or "ethical life ." Moralitiit , which begins with Socrates and reaches its high point in Kantian
morality, is individual, reflective, and rational. It is based on the autonomy of individual self-consciousness, on personal conviction and conscience, and is a relatively late development in history . Sittlichkeit, best
represented perhaps in the Greek polis before Socrates , is ethical behavior governed by natural custom and tradition. It is based on habit in
accordance with the objective laws of the community. Personal reflection
and analysis have little to do with ethical life. 4
Clear and simple examples of the difference between Moralitat and
Sittlichkeit can be found in Plato. Euthyphro , for example, when he is
asked to explain the meaning of a moral notion is quite able to expound
at length on the customs, traditions, and myths that exemplify and
underlie the notion-traditions that it has never occurred to Euthyphro to
question, analyze, or reflect upon. This is Sittlichkeit. Socrates, on the
other hand, forces Euthyphro to analyze and reflect. Socrates asks how
we know that something is moral, why it is moral, what makes it moral;
and it is clear that for Socrates only our own rationality can decide such
questions. This is Moralitat. Again, in the "Myth of Er" at the end of the
Republic, we meet a man who is about to select his next reincarnated life.
We are told that in his previous life he had been a good man but only
because he had been brought up in a good city. His ethical behavior had
been based on custom, tradition, habit, and upbringing, not on philosophy, reason, and reflection. He had behaved properly , but not because
he knew what morality was. Consequently, possessing Sittlichkeit but
lacking Moralitat, he chooses the life of a grand tyrant before noticing
that it will involve eating his own children. 5
The task of the modern ethical theorist, for Hegel, is to reconcile
Sittlichkeit and Moralitat. Sittlichkeit without Moralitat is inadequate.
And, for Hegel, Moralitat without Sittlichkeit is impossible, as can be
seen in Hegel 's critique of Kantian morality-the highest form of Morali-
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tat. In the Phenomenology, Hegel argues that it is impossible to discover
one's moral duty simply by analyzing abstract principles to see if they
are universal and noncontradictory. For example, both private property
and its opposite-common ownership or the absence of private property-are equally universalizable and noncontradictory. Without Sittlichkeit-without an objective, immediately given, ethical substance embedded in custom and tradition, which actually is rather than merely ought
to be-it is impossible to discover one's moral obligation through analysis.6 Moralitat gets its content from Sittlichkeit. Moreover, Moralitat
without Sittlichkeit would leave us with an inadequate form of freedom .
Certainly for Kantian Moralitat, the individual is free; in fact, morality is
based on freedom . But it is individual subjectivity alone that is free, the
individual will deciding its action in accordance with reason. The individual is not necessarily free to realize the moral action. The world may well
present obstacles to its execution without, for Kant, affecting the individual's moral freedom in the slightest.7 For Kant, such empirical factorswhether they be obstacles or aids-are irrelevant to freedom. Nor do
feelings play a role. They need not agree with the action for it to be moral
and free. Nor is our freedom affected if our feelings are opposed to the
moral action. 8 But for Hegel and Marx, freedom is realized only when the
objective external world and our feelings fit, agree with, and support the
subjective rational freedom of the individual. Laws and institutions,
feelings and customs, as well as the rationality of the individual, must
form a single organic spiritual unity.
Thus , for Hegel and Marx, freedom demands three things: (1) that the
individual be self-determined by universal and rational principles; (2) that
the laws and institutions of the state also be rational, so that in obeying
civil laws you obey the laws of your own reason; and (3) that feeling and
custom have been molded so as to agree with and support these rational
laws. 9
For Kant, the possibility of freedom required that the transcendental
self not be located in the natural, causally determined, phenomenal world.
A noumenal realm, apart from the natural, was necessary as the source
of self-determined free action . Many German philosophers after Kant
(including Marx and Hegel), in rejecting the existence of an unknown
thing-in-itself, 10 reject the existence of this noumenal realm and thus must
have a different model of freedom. Rather than locate a transcendental
self in a realm apart, they deny that there are such different realms and
they view reality as a single field with two elements reacting against each
other such that ultimately the natural objective element is absorbed into
the conscious subjective element. In this way the object is no longer alien
or other. They argue in various ways that the subject is the essence of the
object-that it finds itself, its own rationality , in the object. Thus , the
object is not heteronomous but compatible with the subject's freedom.
For Hegel , this requires an Absolute Spirit or God, responsible for
creating and molding the natural and social world through history . Ulti-
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mately, for the young Marx, the human species-through its Jaborconstitutes, molds, and purposively controls the objective social and
natural realm. 11 The subject exists and develops within the natural and
social realm, but it also constitutes and comes to control it. The subject
constitutes the object, objectifies itself in it, finds itself at home with it ,
and thus is free.
The human species works on its world through history and transforms
it to conform with its own essence, such that in confronting the world the
human species discovers itself and becomes conscious of the power of its
own rationality objectively embedded in that world. Freedom, in short, is
this development and objectification of reason in the world. Realizing this
and living accordingly is morality.
For Marx in his earliest writings, " morality is based on the autonomy
of the human mind " and freedom " is the generic essence of all spiritual
existence." To understand Marx's ethics we must begin to understand
his concept of essence and how it is linked to freedom and the state. In
the first place , for Marx, essences develop. Freedom, for example, much
as for Hegel , develops from being the special privilege of particular
individuals to being a universal characteristic of all human beings. 12 Each
sphere or institution in the state has its own essence that develops
according to the inner rules of its life. This is its particular freedom , and
it must be allowed to develop in its own particular way . For Marx, "only
that which is a realization of freedom can be called humanly good. " 13
Moral good, for Marx, is the realization of freedom. Freedom does not
mean being unhindered in any and all ways, but it means the unhindered
development of what is the essence of the thing. The realization of the
thing's essence-its nature, what it inherently is-is the thing's good.
As we shall come to see even more clearly, Marx's concept of essence
is in many ways like Aristotle's. For Aristotle, the essence of a thing is
formulated in its definition. The essence cannot be independent of its
matter or substratum, but neither can it be defined in terms of its matter
alone. The definition grasps the form of the thing. 14 For Aristotle, the
thing is more properly said to be what it is when it has attained to the
fulfillment of its form than when it exists potentially. The essence of the
thing is exhibited in the process of growth or development by which the
form or essence is attained. Each thing has a process, activity, or
function; and when it fully achieves its proper activity or function, it
realizes its essence and achieves its end or good. For human beings, their
proper activity-their end, their essence-is activity in accordance with
reason, and the realization of this end implies happiness. 15 In certain
ways Marx's concept of essence is closer to Aristotle's than to Hegel's.
For Marx and Aristotle, things exist on their own and have their own
essence. For Hegel, at least ultimately, there is a single essence and this
essence is identified with the Idea or God. 16 For Hegel, individual empirical things are products, manifestations , of the Idea. Marx criticizes Hegel
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for turning things into attributes, predicates, of the Idea. Marx argues
that this robs individual things of their own reality. 17
On the other hand, Marx does not accept Aristotle's notion that the
form or end of a thing is fixed and unchanging. 18 For Marx, essences
change and develop through history. Furthermore, Aristotle does not
have much to say about a link between freedom and essence, whereas,
for Marx as for Hegel, there is an intimate connection between freedom,
the laws of the state, and essence.
In his earliest writings, Marx has not rejected law as he does later.
Freedom exists in the state as law ; in fact, a " statute-book is a people's
bible of freedom." Laws are the positive universal norms in which
freedom-the development of essence-acquires a theoretical existence
independent of the arbitrariness of individuals. Universal laws embody
essence; on the other hand, the particular interests of individuals are
unessential, arbitrary , and accidental. To be led by particular interests
rather than universal rational law is to be immorally , irrationally , and
slavishly subordinated to a particular object. Laws cannot be subordinate
to wishes ; wishes must be subordinate to laws. 19 Echoing Rousseau' s
claim in Emile that subordination to persons is slavery while subordination to rational law is freedom, Marx holds that persons must not stand
above laws nor can persons be a guarantee against bad laws or the misuse
of laws. Instead, laws must be the guarantee against persons and their
particular interests. For Marx, unconscious natural laws of freedom are
formulated as conscious laws of the state. Laws are thus the reflection of
actual life in consciousness. Since laws embody essence (which is to say ,
since they are natural), when the individual ceases to obey these laws of
freedom the state can compel the individual to obey the law and thus, as
for Rousseau, it compels the individual to be free. A civil law is like a law
of nature. For example, it is like the law of gravity in that it confronts the
individual as something alien and restrictive only when the individual
attempts to violate or ignore the law. The laws of the state are the
conscious expression of natural laws; they express the essence of things.
The laws of the state do not regulate the legal nature of things; rather, the
legal nature of things regulates the laws of the state. 20
For Marx, there are two interconnected sides to any moral or political
reality: an objective and a subjective side . To understand the objective
side, a scientific study of the concrete empirical object itself is necessary.
The subjective side requires the formulation of the essence of the object
as a conscious, universal, and recognized law. On the objective side,
instead of attributing everything to individual will, one must study the
actual nature of the circumstances as these can independently determine
the actions of individuals . Moreover, Marx thinks that such study can
bring about the same degree of certainty as that achieved in natural
science. He argues that the legislator, in order to formulate laws , should
be a natural scientist. Civil laws are not made or invented any more than
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the law of gravity is; the actual inner laws of social relations are discovered and consciously formulated as civil Jaws. 21
Marx is willing to say that " in the political sphere, philosophy has done
nothing that physics, mathematics, medicine, and every science, have not
done in their respective spheres." Just as science emancipated itself from
theology and established its own independent sphere, so modern political
theorists proceed by deducing the natural laws of the state from reason
and experience, not from theology. 22
Once this objective concrete study of the particular essence of a specific
object has been carried out, then, on the subjective side, the essence
must be formulated conceptually and rationally as a universal law that
becomes an ideal self-conscious image of reality and can be recognized
as such. This subjective formulation is just as important as the objective
study. As Kant said, freedom consists not in acting in accordance with
Jaw but in accordance with the concept of law. 2 3
Marx tells us that we must measure existence by essence. We must
evaluate any particular reality by measuring it against its idea or concept. 24 An essence is grasped abstractly and conceptually; it is the idea
or concept of a thing-its definition, Aristotle would say- as opposed to
its sensuous empirical existence. 25 Moral evil is the outcome of a state of
affairs in which an empirical existent is shut off from and fails to live up
to its essence. Marx later calls this failure alienation. On the other hand,
moral good is the result of existence conforming to essence. 26 Thus, for
example, we can evaluate the moral worth of a state by examining its
essence and asking whether or not the actual state fulfils, lives up to, or
can be derived from and justified by this essence. 2 7
When we turn to a consideration of the human essence, we must add
another concept. Anything, for Marx, is an aspect of the human essence
if that thing is needed by the human being. The presence of need indicates
that an existent is essential to a being: without it the being cannot have a
full , realized, and satisfied existence. 28 If this need is frustrated, if it
cannot be satisfied, or if its satisfaction frustrates other needs , existence
is out of accord with essence, and alienation is present.
We have already said that for Marx the human essence develops.
Marx's concept of need is an important tool for understanding this
development. New needs arise and are transformed in the context of
evolving social conditions and relations. Moreover, new needs set the
individual specific tasks and thus require transformation of the world if
the need is to be satisfied. By following and understanding the reciprocal
transformation of needs and of the world , we can chart the development
of the human essence. Needs-for example, for food, human interaction,
or education-are not satisfied in the same way and through the same
cultural processes at all times. They have different contents and objects,
and their satisfaction involves different sorts of activities. Thus for Marx
the needs are different needs. 29 Even basic needs are different needs in
different historical periods. 30 By understanding what at a particular his-
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torical point is experienced as a need, we then can understand the level
to which the human essence has developed and the degree to which
existence has been transformed to fit the level that essence has reached.
We then can evaluate the situation morally. For example, by determining
the specific character of needs generated in a particular society and the
productive forces and social processes available for satisfying these
needs, we can begin to discover to what extent needs are satisfied, and
we can measure this against the degree to which needs can be satisfied,
or should be satisfied. We can discover to what extent existence corresponds to essence.
Moreover, existing needs always point not merely to the past but to the
future . They continually indicate how existence must be further transformed to meet our needs and further realize our essence. The successful
transformation of existence to satisfy a need will transform the need or
allow new needs to be felt. This will give rise to a demand for a further
transformation of existence. Humans always have a moral goal; they
always are involved in transforming existence to fit their essence.
How do we judge, once we have grasped the objective nature of a thing
and formulated it conceptually as law, whether essence and existence are
in accord? Here Marx has been strongly influenced by Kant, and we can
begin to see how Marx's concepts of essence and freedom are linked to
his concept of universalization. Marx holds that the test of whether
existence measures up to essence is to compare form and content. The
content of the law must not contradict the form of the law. The objective
content of law arises from the particular nature-the actual life-of the
thing in question. On the other hand, for Marx as for Kant, universality
is the proper form that any law must have. 31 The content of law must be
capable of being given a universal form without contradiction. The state
and its laws must represent universal ends , not private or particular
interests. If laws represent private interest (the interest of a special group
or class opposed to others), the state becomes a mere means to further
this private interest, 32 and the content of the law contradicts the universal
form of law.
This concept of universalization can go some way toward distinguishing
true from false needs-essential needs as opposed to mere whims that it
would be foolish to take as essential. 33 Needs that we could will that all
human beings develop and satisfy would be true needs . However, unlike
Kant, universalization does not seem to be the sole criterion for Marx. In
the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, his goal is to develop
a human being rich in needs- a human being with as wide as possible a
range of needs and the highest possible development of each need (as
well, of course, as the means of satisfying them). It would also seem
likely, since he is opposed to leveling and homogenization, that he is after
diversity of needs. 34 Thus it would not make sense to limit true needs to
those needs we would will that all human beings develop. Marx operates
not just with a Kantian categorical imperative but with an Aristotelian
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concept of essence, and the realization of one's essence calls for the
development of needs that might not be universalizable. However, the
principle of universalization can still operate here in a negative way. It
can tell us that those needs whose satisfaction would contradict, hinder,
or frustrate the development and satisfaction of the needs of others must
be ruled out . Any needs that would not be objectionable in this waythough we would not will that everyone develop them-would be true
needs in the sense that they develop the human essence. 35
In further agreement with Kant, Marx holds publicity to be a test of
Jaws. He holds that private interest " cannot bear the light of publicity."
For Kant, any action that would be frustrated by publicly proclaiming it
beforehand is to be considered illegal. This principle functions in the legal
sphere much as the categorical imperative does in the moral sphere. Marx
and Kant agree that only what is universal can stand the light of publicity;
particular interests that contradict the general interest cannot: form and
content would be in contradiction. For Marx , when laws are formulated ,
material content is idealized and raised to the conscious level of public
universality such that a people can see itself, its essence , reflected in a
mirror.36
At this point, it should be clear that Marx in many ways agrees with
the natural law tradition. He holds that there is an independent moral
ground from which to judge the validity or justice of civil Jaws; laws are
not valid simply because they have been properly instituted. He sees this
normative criterion of civil law as rational and rooted in nature and, like
many natural law theorists, sees a close relationship between descriptive
laws of nature and Jaws as prescriptive social norms. Finally , as does
much of this tradition, Marx holds a doctrine of essence-one very much
like Aristotle's.
Marx' s concept of nature is an unusual one, and is quite different, say,
from Kant's. Laws of nature and civil laws that are like Jaws of nature
are not opposed to freedom as " phenomena" is opposed to " noumena. "
Such civil laws are laws of freedom given three conditions: (I) that these
laws embody our essence (and our essence is natural ; we are parts of
nature); (2) that these laws are universal and rational (not based on
particular interest) ; and (3) that the unconscious essential laws of the
object have been consciously recognized and publicly instituted as universal norms such that we act in accordance with the concept of law, not
just in accordance with law.37 Marx is not confusing facts with values. It
is not enough simply to follow nature or one's essence. One must
rationally know what this essence is and act accordingly, in the sense
that one' s act is regulated by conscious, publicly recognized, universal
principles . Yet in doing so, one's act does not stem from a realm outside
of nature, as for Kant, nor is the act contrary to nature. The human
being, including consciousness and reason, is a part of nature for Marx. 38
Marx 's concept of e ssence makes possible the transition from fact to
value. Much as for Aristotle, discovering the essence of a thing is to
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discover what it is in fact, and this tells us what particular individuals of
the species can become. It allows us to identify the range of possible
development and the fullest development of the thing in a factual way.
With human beings, reason can then seek to realize these possibilities.
But why ought reason to seek this end? Why should it value such a goal?
Reason must do so to realize itself. It too is a part of nature and has an
essence to realize. If it does not do so, if it does not unfold itself (which
is its natural course), we can say that it has been frustrated and is unfree.
But this is still to say that it merely must or can realize itself, not yet that
it ought to. If an acorn succeeds or fails in becoming a oak tree, we do
not speak of the presence or absence of moral freedom. But if a human
being-if reason-succeeds or fails in realizing itself, we do. Reason aims
at its realization because of its nature . But this aim is not impressed on it
from outside, nor is its aim immanent but unconscious. Because of its
particular nature, reason can achieve its realization only in a particular
way-consciously and freely. Here we can say legitimately that reason
ought to realize itself, because it can realize itself only by acting consciously and freely, and yet we also can say that it is its nature to do so.
Marx's view, however, is even more complex than this. If to be actual,
objects must be constituted and recognized, then facts are not simple
givens. Natural objects , for Marx- and recall that the essences of natural
objects are the basis for the formulation of civil laws-are not given
factually , but constituted. Furthermore, our consciousness, our needs,
and thus our values play a role in determining this constitution. Thus, we
cannot have a neat distinction between facts and values. Nature is
transformed and developed by human beings. This process is directed by
their needs, which in part are needs for given natural objects; but labor,
in satisfying need, transforms both the natural object and our needs and
consciousness, and reciprocally our needs and consciousness play a part
in constituting facts- natural objects. Thus, when we study natural objects-which already are value embedded-in order to grasp their essence
and derive civil laws, we cannot say that we deduce moral conclusions
from nonmoral premises. Facts and values interpenetrate all along the
way .
This would also be true for human beings. We have said that they are
formed by their culture-by other human beings. The human essence,
then, is not just factually given; it is constituted and developed by the
social and cultural activity, the labor, of other human beings who form
the culture we internalize. Moreover-since values and needs would
obviously play a part in constituting culture-as we internalize this
culture, our essence would be formed by these values and needs. Values
then would be embedded in our essence. Fact and values would interpenetrate here too. So again, when we stud y the human essence so as to
formulate universal moral laws, we would not be deducing moral conclusions from nonmoral premises.
It is true to say that we cannot deduce moral conclusions from non-

222

Part Ill, Marx and Aristotle

moral premises. But it does not follow from this that we cannot derive
values from facts. If a set of abstract premises could be exclusively
factual and truly contain or imply no values , then we could not deduce
moral conclusions from them. But if real world facts-especially if they
are constituted by us- already have values embedded or implied in them,
we can derive values from these facts .
Thus, to say that morality means realizing one's essence does not mean
that morality is being reduced to merely acting in accordance with nature
or being determined by our nature. This alone would not make us moral
or free . Our essence, it is true, is to be part of nature; but nature,
existence, has been transformed to accord with it. Our essence has also
developed, and consciousness was the most important factor in this
development. As we have seen, in transforming our existence to suit our
essence, we transform our world and thus ourselves in accordance with
our needs and values. This is a process in which facts and values
inevitably interpenetrate, mutually influence each other, and thus develop. To fully realize our essence, this process finally must take place
consciously and freely. We must discover and bring to consciousness the
values that have been objectified in our world and formulate them as
universal rational laws. If we regulate our actions in accordance with
these laws, then we have realized our essence and are free and moral.
Eugene Kamenka discusses these matters in a particularly clear way.
His book on Marx's ethics39-especially chapter 9-is most impressive,
though I am not in agreement with everything he says. In connection with
the fact-value controversy, he points out that "good" has been treated
both as a quality and as a relation. A scientific or an objective form of
ethics can be established most easily if good is treated as a quality. Here,
good is taken to be a characteristic that can be investigated in a factual
way. Such an approach, however, destroys the illusion that there is
anything about the good that logically implies or requires that we seek or
support it. On the other hand, a traditional advocative conception of
ethics is most easily established by treating good as a relation. Here,
good is something for us-something demanded, required, or pursued,
which it is wrong to reject. However, Kamenka suggests that, if good is
treated as a relation and not a quality, there can be nothing objective
about claiming the good should be sought.
For Kamenka, ethics can be advocative or objective, but not both-as
that would mean that good had to be both a quality and a relation.
Kamenka thinks such an amalgamation is confused and would lead to
treating relations as constituting the qualities of things. This position
follows from a doctrine of internal relations, as Bertell Oilman points
out. 4°Kamenka argues that things cannot be constituted by their relations
because a thing must have qualities before it can enter into relations. It
must be something before it can be commended, rejected, or pursued.
Qualities do not depend logically on relations, nor do qualities by themselves imply relations.
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Thus Kamenka rejects a strict doctrine of internal relations of the sort
Oilman attributes to Marx.41 Carol Gould has shown that Marx does not
hold such a strict doctrine of internal relations in the later writings. 42
Even in Marx's early writings , it seems to me that relations do not
constitute qualities, though they do transform preexisting qualities. In
particular, our most essential relation to things-labor-transforms the
qualities of natural objects, of our needs, our senses, and our consciousness. This is not, prima facie , an illegitimate way to link qualities and
relations, facts and values.
Kamenka seems to understand what Marx is trying to do, and he argues
that to accomplish it Marx is driven to absorb all differences into a strict
monism . Since Kamenka thinks that the only way to amalgamate qualities
and relations, facts and values , is to hold that relations create or constitute qualities, he holds that Marx is driven to the untenable position that
all qualities must be absorbed into relations, that all differences between
subject and object, the human being and nature, must disappear: they
must be totally obliterated. The object must be totally absorbed into the
subject. 43 But this is not Marx's position. Marx holds very clearly in the
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts that an objective being, a human
being, must be related to independent objects outside itself. 44 Labor does
constitute or absorb, but only by transforming preexisting qualities of the
object. Thus, it does not obliterate all distinction between subject and
object. It only unifies subject and object in essence. It overcomes the
alienness of the object, not all difference. 45

II
We have said enough about Marx's concepts of freedom, essence, and
universalization for us to have at least a basic idea of what morality
means to him and now we can begin to discuss what he sees as most
important, namely , how such morality is to be realized in the world.
Marx is seeking an agent with certain characteristics-an agent capable
of transforming society in a revolutionary way because this agent' s
natural course, its essence, leads it toward the universal. Its activity and
goal are moral because it is capable of reconciling essence and existence
and thus of actually realizing freedom and morality in the world. In his
Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, Marx finally
decides that the proletariat is the historical agent he is looking for.
Philosophical criticism, Marx argues, gives rise to a "categorical imperative" to overthrow all relations in which man is not "the highest
being for man. " Just as for Kant, human beings must be treated as ends
in themselves. All institutions that treat humans merely as means must
be transformed in a revolutionary way. If this revolution is to realize the
categorical imperative that humans be treated as ends in themselves , then
theory-the philosophical ideas of German Philosophy-must become a
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material force. To do this, philosophical theory must grip the masses. 46
This can only happen if theory matches and realizes the needs of the
masses. A fit between theory and need will close the gap between
philosophical ideals and the world-between essence and existence. The
universal-freedom and the categorical imperative--and particular needs
will accord and promote each other. Marx tries to argue that the particular
class interest of the proletariat truly accords with the universal: it accords
with the categorical imperative. Marx's point is a very interesting and
ingenious one. Because the proletariat is so oppressed, so deprived and
degraded, its particular class interest-its selfish needs-are so fundamental that they could hardly be viewed as demands for special privileges.
Such needs and interests would be the basic needs and interests of any
and all human beings. They would be essential needs-needs for decent
food, clothing, shelter, education, normal human development, and so
forth- needs we would demand be satisfied for anybody. These would be
needs that the categorical imperative would demand be satisfied for all.
Because the proletariat is so oppressed, its particular interests correspond with the categorical imperative.
Thus Marx thinks that the proletariat " cannot emancipate itself without
.. . emancipating all other spheres of society. " The proletariat " is the
complete loss of man and hence can win itself only through the complete
rewinning of man. " 47 Since the proletariat's needs are essential needsneeds in accordance with the categorical imperative--if we can satisfy
them , if we realize the universal, we can emancipate humankind generally.
Nevertheless, one might object that there remains a fundamental difference between Kant and Marx. For Marx it is revolution that realizes
morality, while for Kant revolution is rejected as immoral. This would
seem to make their views quite dissimilar. But even here , if we carefully
study Kant's views on revolution, we will find less of a difference from
Marx than we might expect.
Kant develops what he calls a " principle of publicity," which he thinks
shows that revolution is illegal. The principle of publicity functions for
legality much as the categorical imperative functions for morality. Any
action that would be frustrated if it were revealed publicly beforehand,
Kant holds, must be considered illegal. The principle as stated here is
negative. It will tell us that actions incompatible with publicity should be
illegal; but on the other hand, it is not the case that all actions compatible
with publicity should therefore be considered legal . For example, a
powerful government with a sufficiently strong army may well be able to
reveal an oppressive plan without at all risking its failure. 48 The principle
will indicate some but not all acts that should be illegal.
Thus, for Kant, the principle of publicity shows revolution to be
illegal. 49 However, Marx employs a principle of publicity to support
revolution. How is this disagreement possible? The answer, it seems to
me, is that Kant has made a mistake. He confuses a revolution with a
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and then independent market laws set in-market laws that cannot be
controlled by any individual. Since human beings need these products
but do not control them, they come to be dominated by the process of
exchange. They are estranged. Moreover, since need indicates essence,
the inability to satisfy need indicates that one's existence is estranged
from one' s essence. 53
Again, since human beings need other human beings in many ways (to
carry on production at anything more than the most minimal level; even
to develop language; and, in short, to develop as human beings), then,
given that need indicates essence, it follows for Marx that we are related
essentially to others: the human essence is social. In an exchange economy these essential social relationships, Marx thinks, are estranged .
Exchange and money, as they develop, stand between human beings and
mediate-indeed, control-their interaction . This is quite visible during
economic crises , but it occurs at all times. Humans are not free ; their
essential relations are controlled by an alien power. 54
Moreover, like Aristotle, Marx thinks that exchange perverts human
virtue. Moral virtues no longer appear as ends to be sought but as means
we are forced to use to achieve ends determined by the market. For
example, in the relationship between lender and borrower (which Marx
discusses at some length), normal human virtues are calculated in terms
of potential credit risk. Trustworthiness, for example, no longer appears
as a value or a virtue that is an end in itself; for the borrower it becomes
a means to gain credit, and for the lender it appears as a means to ensure
the likelihood of repayment. The value of a human being is estimated in
money. Credit standards become the standards of morality; and human
beings are viewed as elements , means, in an impersonal and alien process.
Given the existence of human need and the lack of control over the
products necessary to satisfy these needs, human morality will almost
inevitably be shaped, dominated, and distorted by market forces .55
So also, in a developed exchange economy, the . essential activity of
human beings-which for Marx is their labor-no longer aims at producing products directly needed by the laborer. It no longer serves to realize
the human essence. Labor and its product become a mere means to be
exchanged for a wage to guarantee bare existence. Existence is not
transformed and made a means to realize essence ; rather, essence,
essential human activity, becomes a means to preserve a minimal existence. For Marx as for Aristotle, production or " wealth-getting" directed
toward the satisfaction of basic needs and the preservation of life or
existence is, of course, necessary. But such activity is not properly one's
highest end. It should be seen as the necessary basis for allowing one to
proceed on to the sorts of activities involved in the good life-a life
involving activities that are ends in themselves and thus the highest
realization of one's essence.56 To turn these activities into means to mere
existence is to turn things upside down and to fail to realize one' s essence.
Again like Aristotle , Marx thinks that, without exchange, humans
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would produce no more than they needed . The limit of need would form
the limit of production. Production would be measured by need and thus
by the human essence. This, for Marx, is real exchange-the exchange
of labor for the product. In a market economy with wage labor, what is
produced is not controlled by the wage worker. Here, need no longer
measures production; but production, or the ownership of the product, is
the measure of how far needs will be satisfied. Independent and alien
forces determine the distribution of the product and thus the extent to
which need and essence are satisfied .57
There is another problem involved in exchange. Adam Smith, and
Hegel as well, argue that in an exchange economy a common good is
produced unconsciously through an invisible hand. Each seeks their own
self-interest; but, given the complex interdependence of each on all, selfseeking produces the common good more effectively than if individuals
had sought it consciously.
It is quite clear that Marx completely rejects the Smith-Hegel model
for society. Moreover, his objection is in large part a moral one. As far
back as Socrates, and certainly for Aristotle as well as for Kant, simply
to produce a good, or to act merely in accordance with given moral
expectations, does not amount to morality. To act morally, one must
know rationally what the good is, and the act must be motivated by this
rational knowledge. To act selfishly and allow a good to come about
behind your back-no matter how effective it might be-is not moral.
Morality requires conscious intent. We have already seen that to realize
one's essence requires that this essence be grasped consciously and that
one should set about transforming existence accordingly. The same
applies at the social level. 58
It is true that Marx relies on self-interest rather than morality as the
motive force of revolution (though morality and interests do converge).
An invisible-hand argument has a legitimate place in explaining how it is
possible to move from existing society to an ideal society because it
allows us to avoid simply positing that people first must become ideally
moral in order to realize the ideal society. But invisible-hand arguments
have no place, for Marx, when discussing the ideal society itself. This
society must be consciously and purposively directed. In fact , even when
Marx does use ari invisible-hand argument, we must see that his approach
is different from that of Adam Smith for whom competitive self-seeking
unconsciously produces a common good. For Marx, while interests do
unconsciously tend toward the common good or the ideal society, to
move effectively toward this ideal society we must become aware of this
tendency and assist it consciously. In his discussion of such an ideal
society, Marx says,
Let us suppose we had carried out production as human beings .. . . (1) In
my production I would have objectified my individuality, its specific character, and therefore enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of my life
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during the activity, but also when looking at the object I would have the
individual pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective, visible to the
senses and hence a power beyond all doubt. (2) In your enjoyment or use of
my product I would have the direct enjoyment of being conscious of having
satisfied a human need by my work, that is, of having objectified man's
essential nature, a nd of having created an object corresponding to the need
of another man's essential nature. (3) I would have been for you the mediator
between you and the species, and therefore would have become recognized
and felt by yourself as a completion of your own essential nature and as a
necessary part of yourself, and consequently would know myself to be
confirmed both in your thought and your love. (4) In the individual expression of my life I would have directly created your expression of your life,
and therefore in my individual activity I would have directly confirmed and
realized my true nature, my human nature, my communal nature.
Our products would be so many mirrors in which we saw reflected our
essential nature. 59

Social relationships, for Marx, should be direct and conscious. The
common good should not be produced through an invisible hand; the
needs of others should be satisfied consciously and purposefully. Exchange should not be allowed to operate independently of human beings,
out of their control, dominating and frustrating their needs, subverting
human values and virtue, standing between human beings and dominating
their interaction. Humans should consciously and purposively direct their
own interaction.
We have said that, since need indicates essence , the fact that humans
need each other indicates that their essence is social. It is true that human
need will produce social interaction whether human beings consciously
regulate it or not. Humans must interact socially in order to produce,
distribute products , and develop. If not consciously directed , this interaction will take the form of exchange, and market forces will come to
dominate individuals and produce estrangement. If this interaction is
cooperative, consciously controlled, and purposively directed, then society (Gesellschaft) is transformed into a community (Gemeinschaft) . Conscious cooperative and purposive control of social interaction produces
community. Marx clearly is arguing that a community-a communal
organization of society-is the only sort of society that can realize the
human essence; it is the only moral society. The human essence is
communal. In general, essence is only fully realized if it is brought to
consciousness and if existence is transformed to fit essence. To realize
fully the human essence, social interaction must be understood consciously and directed purposively. Society must be transformed consciously.60 In short, human interaction must be communal if existence is
to accord with essence.
Thus, Marx envisions a society in which need directly regulates production. Individuals work not merely as a means to exist, but in order to
satisfy and develop needs , that is, to realize their essence. The distribu-
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tion of products in this society should take the form of direct communal
sharing purposively designed to satisfy the needs of others such that a
conscious bond is formed. In such a society, one would recognize
consciously as well as feel the power and importance of others who
satisfy and develop one' s essence and one's own power and importance
in satisfying the essence of others. Social relations would be moral
relations. Relationships between individuals would be like the community
of friends that Aristotle thought necessary for a good state. 61 Furthermore, community, for Marx, replaces the existing alienation of civil
society from the political state. It transforms unconscious civil society
into a consciously controlled and purposively directed economic community and eliminates the dominating estranged political state by making
the universal elements of community and cooperation operative in dayto-day life.
Marx claims that the human essence is social, whereas Aristotle claims
that humans are political animals. These claims may appear incompatible,
but they are not. Aristotle do~s not make a distinction between the social
and the political. Marx does distinguish between the two; but when he
claims that the human essence is social, he is not opposing the social to
the political, as he does when he opposes civil society to the political
state. For Marx, both state and society are to be absorbed into community. We certainly cannot say that, for Marx, the human essence is social
as opposed to political or communal. The highest realization of society is
community, and the political state involves community in an alienated
form along with domination. To realize the human essence means to
overcome the isolation of society as well as the domination and estrangement of the political state by realizing community. The realized human
essence is communal. For Aristotle, we can say that the " political"
involves both communal interaction and domination-certainly the domination of slaves. 62 Thus, both thinkers hold that realized human beings
require community. The difference between Marx and Aristotle, then, is
that Marx wants community without domination. However, at points, this
even seems to be Aristotle's ideal. He says, "If ... every tool, when
summoned, or even of its own accord, could do the work that befits it,
just as the creations of Daedalus moved of themselves, or the tripods of
Hephaestos went of their own accord to their sacred work ... then there
would be no need either of apprentices for the master, or of slaves for the
lords. " 63

IV
In the Comments on Mill and especially in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, we find clearly presented the very important
concept of objectification (Vergegenstandlichung), which allows Marx to
formulate many of his views in a sharper and clearer way. An object, for
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Marx, is the result of an objectification: it is an entity necessary to
maintain the existence and to satisfy the essence of another being.
Objectification, for Marx, is the expression , manifestation, or realization
of the powers of an entity in an object. For example, Marx says the plant
has the sun as its object: the plant needs the sun to exist and grow. And
reciprocally, the sun has the plant as its object: the sun realizes, objectifies, its life-developing powers in the growth of the plant. For humans , an
object is something needed by the human being to satisfy its essence and
maintain its existence; food , for example, is the object of hunger. Humans
also need objects in which they can objectify their powers-for example,
raw material on which to work. Human beings must labor upon nature
and transform it in order to satisfy their needs. 64 They transform existence
to suit their essence. The existing natural world is thus rearranged and
formed through labor, fashioned into the sorts of objects that can satisfy
the existing level of needs and essence. The need-satisfying object is the
outcome, the product, of a process of objectification. Objectification
begins with a subject whose powers, capacities, and ideas have developed
historically to a given level as conditioned by the subject's social worldits specific level of technology, organization of production, culture, and
so forth. For these subjective factors (these powers, capacities, and ideas)
to be objectified-that is, realized and developed-they must be set to
work and produce an object. If they are not set to work, not exercised,
they certainly do not develop , and in fact they really do not exist except
in potential. One can identify the level to which these subjective factors
have developed by studying the sorts of objects human beings are capable
of producing. Furthermore, with the production of a new object-say, a
tool-new powers and capacities will be called into play, exercised, and
developed in using the tool; these then can give rise to new ideas and
needs, which can call for further new objects and thus again new powers,
capacities, and ideas to produce and use them. Needed objects promote
the development of objectification, and objectification promotes the development of needed objects. Existence is transformed, and needs and
essence develop.
To realize the human essence, for Marx, it is not only necessary to
realize and to satisfy the needs of human beings, but it is also necessary
to develop their powers. In fact, there is an intimate connection between
powers and needs for Marx. The ability to realize any power would
involve certain needs, as, for example, when workers need raw material
in which to realize their labor. The satisfaction of any need would imply
the maintaining, reinforcing, or realizing of a power, as, for example, the
satisfaction of the need for food sustains workers' abilities to manifest
their power through labor. Furthermore, the drive to realize any power,
for Marx, would be felt as a need-not as a basic need, but as a higher
need. 65 It is important to notice that in the early writings the entire natural
and social world is seen as the outcome of objectification; it has been
progressively transformed by human labor into need-satisfying objects.
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Raw, untransformed nature-Marx thinks-no longer exists, nor could it
satisfy human need. 66
It follows from this concept of objectification, for Marx, that humans
can contemplate themselves in their object. They can view their entire
world as something produced by themselves-the realization of their
powers and ideas. They find the world to be a place that satisfies their
needs and thus confirms and reinforces them.67 Their existence has been
transformed to correspond with their essence. Their objects are not alien
and other; they are their essence.
Moreover, for Marx, individuals should have the same relation to other
human beings. Other humans are the individual's objects; they are needed
by the individual. In a very interesting way Marx is trying to rid the terms
object and need of their usual meaning. To say that humans are objects is
not to say that they are things, or that they are needed as we need things,
or that they are to be used as things. Objects, for Marx, are not means;
they are ends. Objects are part of our essence. To say that other human
beings (i.e., humankind , or the human species) are our object is to say
that we need them. They are part of our essence . Without them, any
complex production would be impossible, language would not exist, and
individuals would not develop as human beings. Moreover, the human
species is an object in the sense that human beings become what they are
at any point in history by internalizing culture and society, which have
been produced as the objectifications of other human beings. We are thus
the products of the objectifications of the human species. So also we
become what we are by exercising and objectifying the powers and
capacities that have been produced in us and thus again influence and
produce others. 68 The products of objectification satisfy and develop not
just the individuals who produced them, but others in society. Objects
produced by others free us from the domination of need and allow us to
pursue higher needs and thus develop higher powers, capacities, and
ideas, which in turn make possible higher forms of objectification and
thus a higher development of others as well as ourselves. The development of the individual's needs and powers, the individual's essence, both
is dependent on and contributes to the development of the species'
powers and needs-the species' essence. Thus we can contemplate ourselves-our essence-in other human beings , and the species in ourselves. The species is the product of our objectification, and we are a
product of its objectification.
We have already seen that Marx wants social interaction to be communal, that is , conscious and purposive. To be free, individuals must
consciously and purposively make the species their object or end. Marx
claims that the human being is a species being and that a species being is
a being capable of making its species the object of its theory and practice.
This means that the ind.ividual is capable of conceiving a universal or
general idea, that is, the idea of the species. Animals, unlike humans, can
only conceive particulars. The human essence is identified by locating
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the characteristics that distinguish humans from animals-the species
from the genus. It is much like the Aristotelian notion that humans are
rational animals. On the other hand, to make the species the object of
practice means to make the species the end or goal of practical activity. 69
Thus, to realize one's essence one must make the species the conscious
object of theory and practice. Since the human essence only develops
through the collective process of transforming existence to suit need and
the objectification of its powers and capacities through labor, and since
the development of the powers and capacities of the species is the
outcome of the objectification of individuals whose powers are developed
due to the objectification of the species, and since the realization of
essence requires consciousness, it follows that the individual's fullest and
highest development is dependent on individuals' making the development of the species their conscious and purposive goal.
Thus, to say that human beings are species beings, that they have a
- _ species essence, or that human labor is species activity is a way of saying
that the human essence is communal, that is , that social interaction must
be conscious and purposive. Individuals are in essence what they become
through interaction with others. To make the development of the species
one's end is to make the development of one's own essence one's end or
object.
Marx's concepts of objectification and of species essence involve a
view of freedom that in many ways is like that of Kant. Unalienated
human beings are self-determined in the sense that they are not driven by
need but regulate the satisfaction of need consciously. They are not
dominated by alien market forces , but control their social interaction
themselves. Such human beings are not determined heteronomously.
Their activity is not determined by particular interests or individual
needs, but is directed consciously toward the realization of the human
essence, that is, toward the satisfaction of needs common to all, needs
that can be universalized, needs whose satisfaction would be demanded
by the categorical imperative.
We must say a bit more about the relationship between needs and the
categorical imperative. Kant, at least in the Critique of Practical Reason,
admits that inclinations, interests, or needs are embedded in the content
of any maxim . But to act morally and freely we must will to carry out the
maxim not because of these interests, needs, or inclinations, but solely
because the maxim is universalizable and thus rational. In other words ,
Kant has no objection to the fact that ends, interests , needs , goods, or
purposes will be embedded in our maxims. They are expected to be
there, but they must not be the elements that determine our will; only the
possibility of universalizing the maxim without contradiction can do that
if the act is to be free and moral . Perhaps the clearest example of this can
be found in Kant's claim that the categorical imperative requires us to
seek our own happiness. It is at least an indirect duty to seek happiness,
not because we desire it (though, of course, we do desire it) , but because
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it is impossible to universalize not seeking it. This too, I think, is Marx's
view. We do not seek the object because it satisfies a particular need or
interest of the individual (though, of course, it does so). That would be to
be need-driven and dominated by the object. That would be heteronomy.
We seek an object because to do so is universalizable, because the need
for the object is common to all human beings, because it would be
impossible to universalize not seeking the object, all of which is also to
say that the object realizes the essence of the species. 70
The categorical imperative applies to powers as well as needs. Even for
Kant the categorical imperative would require individuals to develop their
talents. 71 But, for Marx, powers are not important merely for the individual. The powers of individuals affect and transform the sociocultural
world that other individuals internalize. The entire sociocultural world is
the outcome of what individuals have contributed to it through the
manifestation of their powers, and this sociocultural world molds all
individuals and makes possible the development of their powers . Thus,
for individuals to seek their own realization, they must seek the full
realization of the powers of other individuals-the powers of the species
as a whole. 72 This would require that we act on the universal-in accordance with the categorical imperative, which would demand the realization
of quite specific powers of any particular individual, since such powers
could contribute to the development of the species. It would be society' s
obligation to provide the conditions under which such powers could be
realized. Moreover, as we saw earlier with respect to needs, Marx
operates not just with a Kantian categorical imperative but with an
Aristotelian concept of essence , and the latter would call for the development of powers that we might not be able to will that all human beings
develop but that nevertheless would develop the essence of the individual
and conceivably contribute to the enrichment of the human species. The
categorical imperative would, of course, also demand that those powers
that would harm others should not be realized.
Furthermore, despite the importance of objects, needs, and powers,
Marx implies that it is species activity itself that is our highest goal. Much
as for Aristotle , activities can have their ends or objects outside themselves, or the activity itself can be our highest end. 73 For Marx, it is true
that objects are ends-not means-and that activity cannot occur without
objects and the satisfaction of needs; but it is the activity of producing
objects and satisfying needs that is the highest end, and not the objects of
particular interests or individual needs themselves. The end is a certain
form of activity- activity that is free, that is , conscious and purposively
directed toward the realization of the species. It would not be a means to
something else, but an end in itself. Such action would not be heteronomously determined.
At the same time, we can say that for Kant moral obligation is based
not on seeking the good , but on freedom. We obey the categorical
imperative because only by doing so are we rationally self-determined
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and thus free . Here, too, we do not act to realize an external end; our act
itself-freedom-is the end. For Marx, too, moral obligation is based on
freedom in this way. Free species activity is itself the end. But this also
means that the end is the realization of the essence of the species- its
good. And only through the realization of the essence of the species can
we realize our powers, capacities, and freedom-our own good.
In this way, Marx links Aristotle and Kant. Realizing our essence is
identical with acting on a categorical imperative. This identification is
possible because Marx understands our essence as a species essence. To
realize our essence, we must act consciously and purposefully for the
benefit of the species. But to act for the benefit of the species is to act for
the universal: it is to act on the categorical imperative. Such species
activity is an end in itself. At the same time, to act for the universal is to
realize the species and thus to realize one's own essence; and to realize
one's own essence is to be free.
Marx does not accept the Kantian notion of a noumenal realm. This is
necessary for -Kant because without it we would be entirely situated in
the phenomenal realm, and all of our action would be determined causally
and heteronomously. Instead of a concept of noumena, Marx employs a
concept of essence. In the absence of alienation, neither the object nor
need for the object indicates heteronomy, because the needed object is
not, in itself, heteronomous; it is part of our essence. 74 As we have seen,
both the subject and the object are parts of nature, and the object is
ontologically absorbed into the subject in the sense that the human
species constitutes and comes to control collectively the objective world .
It finds itself reflected in that world, and finds the world to be one with
itself in essence.
Kantian autonomy does not satisfy Marx, because only the intentions
and volitions of the individual are free . In abstracting so radically from
results, consequences, and goods, the individual-for Kant-is free even
if the external world frustrates the realization of subjectively free activity. 75 Not so for Hegel and Marx. The external world-the object- must
have been transformed to fit our essence. It must be a reflection of
ourselves that reinforces and confirms us. The free action of the subject
must be realized in the world for full freedom to be possible . Thus our
relation to the object is not only a free relation but one that realizes our
essence, and thus must be universalizable.
My contention that Marx tries to link Aristotle and Kant can be
reinforced by considering another issue. Marx implies in several places
that species activity ought to lead to happiness or that it ought to be
enjoyable and satisfying. 76 We have discussed already the relation of
species activity to morality and freedom; we now must see how it is
connected to happiness .
Moral theorists view the relation of virtue to happiness in different
ways. Some theorists tend toward identifying the two; others deny such a
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connection . For example, Plato in the Republic (it seems to me) changes
the normal meaning of happiness and redefines it so that it is identical
with, or at least necessarily accompanies, virtue. The contemplation of
the form of the highest good-grasping true being-necessarily involves
true happiness. 77 There is no suggestion of this in Marx. Classical utilitarians, on the other hand, define virtue so as to make it identical with
happiness or at least hold that it follows necessarily from happiness. I
will try to show that this is not Marx's view . Other theorists like Kant
and Aristotle reject the tendency to identify virtue with happiness. 78 One
can be virtuous without necessarily being happy, though one cannot be
happy, at least in the highest sense, without being virtuous. To link virtue
and happiness, further conditions are necessary. To use Kant's language ,
the connection between virtue and happiness is synthetic, not analytic. 79
Though Marx does not discuss these matters explicitly, he seems to be
closer to Aristotle and Kant than to the utilitarians . For example, in
disagreeing with Proudhon he says that higher wages for workers would
only produce better-paid slaves. 80 In other words, higher wages and thus
(certainly for utilitarians) greater enjoyment or happiness would be possible without affecting the fact that workers are alienated and unfree. But
since, as we have seen, moral good requires freedom and the realization
of essence, 81 we can say that happiness without freedom is not a morally
acceptable goal. It certainly would not realize the human essence. Again,
in The German Ideology, Marx argues that the semi-artistic work of the
medieval craftsperson was engaging and enjoyable but that this made the
work even more slavish. 82 In other words, to make alienated and unfree
work enjoyable would be to tie the worker closer to such work and thus
to increase the worker's slavishness. Marx also tells us in The Holy
Family that capitalists are alienated in a market economy-just like
anyone else-but may still be happy and satisfied. 83 Again, happiness
without freedom is morally unacceptable. Morality cannot be identified
with producing greater happiness. 84
How then does Marx link freedom and morality with happiness in the
ideal case? To answer this, we first must notice that happiness can be
understood in at least two ways. Happiness can mean pleasure, the
satisfaction of natural desires or needs, as it does for Kant and at times
for Aristotle. 85 Or it can refer to the satisfaction that accompanies a wellperformed activity, as it does in other places for Aristotle. The higher
this activity-the more it accords with our essence-the higher the
satisfaction or happiness. 86
Using the first definition of happiness, it is not easy to get morality and
happiness to accord. For Aristotle, it is largely a contingent matter. The
virtuous individual simply may suffer disappointment or pain. For Kant,
the agreement of virtue with happiness is called the highest good. To
realize the highest good, moral actions in accordance with universal
rational principles would have to agree with the feelings or inclinations
that produce happiness. For this to be possible, it would mean that the
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natural world would have to be regulated so that the objects that determine feelings and inclination and thus happiness would always determine
them in accordance with the demands of morality. For Kant, the highest
good thus requires a postulate of practical reason- the existence of a
God who would align nature and inclination with morality so that happiness could accompany virtue. 87 For Marx, we might say, the human
species replaces Kant's God. The species itself remakes the natural world
in accordance with its essence such that natural objects and thus the
feelings determined by these objects would agree with the universal and
conscious moral purpose of the species. The species , we might say,
realizes the highest good.
At this point we can see that the two forms of happiness can coincide.
The satisfaction of need, interest, and feeling would occur as the species
transforms its world to suit its essence. But, for Marx, our highest end is
not the satisfaction of needs or interests; it is free species activity itself.
Thus, the satisfaction or happiness that accompanies a well-performed
activity- a satisfaction or happiness that is higher when the activity is
higher or more essential-would also be present. 88
We might also say that, for Marx, the species replaces Aristotle' s final
cause-that highest being for whose good all action is done. It causes by
being loved. Activity done for the final cause involves pleasure or happiness.89 Much the same could be said of the species.
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